Thursday, October 10, 2013

Mother Dies Amid Abuses in $110 Billion U.S. Stent Assembly Line


Najam Azmat snaked a catheter on a guide wire into Judi Gary’s groin as he tried to insert a stent in an artery supplying blood to her pelvis and right leg.
On an X-ray monitor near where Gary lay, nurses saw blood leakages. The wire seemed to be in the wrong place, nurse Evan Gourley told Azmat. Everything was fine, the vascular surgeon replied. It wasn’t.
A stent body is attached to graft material. Stents, metal mesh devices that prop open clogged blood vessels, have been implanted via catheters in seven million heart patients over the last decade. Photographer: Alan Petersime/MCT via Getty Images
Sept. 26 (Bloomberg) -- 7 million Americans have had stents implanted in their arteries in the last decade at a cost of more than $110 billion. Acute life-or-death cases account for about half of the 700,000 Americans who get stents annually. Among the other half, elective-surgery patients in stable condition, a Bloomberg News investigation found that death, injury and outright fraud accompanied the acceptance of the devices as a go-to treatment. Bloomberg's Kevin Thrash reports. (Source: Bloomberg)
Like many rural hospitals, Satilla Regional Medical Center in Waycross, Georgia, has to pay “higher than average physician compensation due to pressures to recruit to the area,” according to a 2011 report prepared for Georgia’s attorney general. Photographer: Sydney P. Freedberg/Bloomberg
In November of 2005, surgeon Najam Azmat tore an artery supplying blood to Norman Wayne Copeland’s left leg during a stent procedure. Source: Family photo via Bloomberg
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Azmat tore Gary’s aorta during the December 2005 procedure, according to documents filed with a U.S. Justice Departmentcivil complaint. Nurses asked another surgeon to step in. Gourley left in disgust. Later, he went to administrators at Satilla Regional Medical Center in Waycross, Georgia, with a warning about Azmat.
“I told them that he will kill a patient if they let him continue to work,” Gourley said. Officials at the Satilla hospital got at least seven similar warnings about Azmat, according to another nurse’s notes.
They let him continue. One of his next patients died.
Azmat’s tenure at the 231-bed hospital, as described in interviews and more than 1,000 pages of medical records, internal documents and witness statements that were made public last year, shows the extremes one hospital went to in order to keep its catheterization clinic -- or “cath lab” -- operating and producing revenue.
Other hospitals paid millions in kickbacks -- using ghost jobs, padded fees, debt forgiveness or discounted office space -- to induce doctors to keep up the pace in U.S. medicine’s binge on stents, according to allegations made in five federal cases and three other private whistle-blower lawsuits.

Needless Stents

Stents, metal mesh devices that prop open clogged blood vessels, have been implanted via catheters in seven million heart patients over the last decade -- perhaps as many as one-third of them needlessly, according to David Brown, a cardiologist at Stony Brook University School of Medicine inNew York. In all, 11 hospitals have agreed to settlements with the Justice Department, resolving civil allegations of needless stenting and related wrongdoing.
Earlier in This Series
Most of these federal lawsuits, typically filed by whistle-blowers under seal, have slowly been made public since 2009. They, along with dozens of interviews with patients and doctors, reveal that hospitals benefited financially while overlooking -- or even encouraging -- allegedly inappropriate stent use.
At Satilla, Azmat punctured the wall of Ruth Minter’s right kidney while trying to insert a stent in an artery near the organ in January 2006. She died 17 days later of complications from heavy blood loss, the federal complaint said. The procedure “was not medically indicated,” according to a Justice Department expert’s report.

No Lifesavers

“People who should have and could have saved Mrs. Minter’s life were too interested in having Dr. Azmat continue to do procedures and make money for the hospital to do the right thing,” said surgeon Harold Kent, who reviewed Minter’s care for a lawsuit her family filed against the doctor and the hospital.
Satilla officials denied that they kept Azmat on the job in order to make money for the hospital’s cath lab, and said his services were both needed and valuable to patients.
“The number one concern of Satilla and the administration was patient safety,” said Joseph P. Griffith Jr., an attorney who represented the hospital and its chief administrator.
The hospital agreed to pay $840,000 to resolve the Justice Department’s complaint that it submitted claims for cath-lab services -- some of them unnecessary -- that Azmat was neither qualified nor properly credentialed to perform. The hospital admitted no wrongdoing.
Azmat declined to be interviewed for this story. He denied in court filings that he caused the death of Ruth Minter.

‘Boiler Room’

The flood of money poured into cardiac stents -- at least $110 billion for procedures over the last decade -- can lead to “corrupted practices,” said William Hsiao, a health-care economist atHarvard University.
Cardiovascular services, including stents, open-heart surgery and other procedures, can account for as much as 40 percent of net revenues in many hospitals, said Vikas Saini, president of the Lown Institute, a neighboring Brookline, Massachusetts-based group that works to extend health care to needy people and limit unnecessary treatments.
“The cath lab is like a boiler room -- the place that makes everything else go” in a hospital, said Saini, a cardiologist. “Hospital administrators will tell you that they don’t make the medical decisions, they don’t decide who gets a stent … ‘It’s our doctors who do that.’ But they have no incentive to scrutinize the behavior and appropriateness of what the doctors are doing. They have every incentive to look the other way.”

Peripheral Growth

Cath labs and similar facilities will generate about $20 billion in billings this year as cardiologists and other specialists evaluate and treat about 4 million patients’ arteries, veins and valves via the long plastic tubes, said Brian Contos, executive director of research for the Advisory Board Company, a health-care consulting group.
Few dispute the benefits of coronary stents when they’re used to restore blood flow in heart-attack patients. Since 2007, when a national study found that coronary stents added no benefit over medicines, exercise and dietary improvements for stable heart patients, their use has declined. Last year, sales of the devices fell 5 percent to $5.5 billion. Meanwhile, sales of so-called peripheral stents, used to increase blood flow in vessels that serve such areas as the legs or kidneys, has increased -- by 8 percent last year to $2.1 billion, according to Health Research International, an industry consultant.

No-Show Jobs

Still, as of 2011, coronary stent procedures were being performed at 1,653 sites in the U.S., Contos said -- up 58 percent from 1998.
In seeking to keep their labs bustling, some hospitals offered cardiologists no-show jobs, according to federal lawsuits.
In Erie, Pennsylvania, Tullio Emanuele said he had just started working as a cardiologist for a group called Medicor Associates in 2001, when his new boss asked him to become a medical director at Hamot Medical Center under a $75,000-a-year contract. Emanuele, a native of Italywho attended medical school in Rome, said he found the post had few responsibilities.
“My duties were just a few hours a month preparing for a meeting,” he said in an interview. He suspected something was wrong when a Medicor clerk asked him to sign timesheets that were already filled out and inflated his hospital hours, he said.

Whistle-Blower Complaint

His “sham” contract was just one of several between Hamot and Medicor that Emanuele says were designed to induce a steady stream of patients for the hospital’s cath lab, according to a whistle-blower complaint he filed under the federal False Claims Act last November. The lawgives people the right to seek to recover money on behalf of the U.S. government in cases of overpayment. The Justice Department has declined to join Emanuele’s complaint, which is pending in federal court.
Emanuele, who worked for Medicor until 2005, said he found cases in which stents were inserted in patients without significant heart disease. One, identified in his complaint only as A.R., died of complications from a needless cardiac catheterization in 2004, according to his lawsuit.
Officials for Hamot, which was purchased in 2011 by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, declined to comment, spokeswoman Caroline Manino said. Neal Devlin, an attorney for Medicor, also declined to comment.
In legal filings, Medicor said its medical directorships at Hamot were “legitimate and legal” and denied that any of its physicians accepted kickbacks or performed unneeded procedures. Hamot denied paying kickbacks or engaging in any unlawful relationships with physicians to induce patient referrals.

‘Recycling Patients’

The cardiologists at EMH Regional Medical Center in Elyria, Ohio, built their heart business by ‘recycling patients’ -- that is, doing repeated procedures, including stents, on the same patients in the hospital’s cath lab -- according to a whistle-blower lawsuit filed by Abdul Wattar, a cardiologist, and unsealed in January.
“I’ve seen patients with an astonishing number of stents that I hadn’t heard before, sometimes exceeding 20 stents,” Wattar said in a deposition. From 2004 to 2009, he worked with a practice called the North Ohio Heart Center, which pressured him and others to refer patients to EMH’s cath lab, he said.
In January, the hospital and the cardiology group agreed to pay the U.S. $4.4 million to settle allegations that they billed Medicare for unnecessary stents from 2001 to 2006. Both deny wrongdoing and say they acted within established practice. EMH has fewer inappropriate stent cases than the average hospital, said Stephen Sozio, an attorney who represented the hospital in the federal lawsuit.

Best Decisions

“The plaintiff’s allegations in these cases had no merit,” said John Schaeffer, the president of North Ohio Heart, in an e-mailed statement. “We made the best medical decisions available then, and we continue to do that now.”
“It was like an assembly line,” said Geraldine Koehler, whose mother, Margarette Kerrigan, was a repeat patient. Kerrigan, 77, died of massive internal bleeding 10 hours after North Ohio Heart’s leading cardiologist, Charles O’Shaughnessy, inserted two stents in 2003, an autopsy report and medical records show. O’Shaughnessy declined to comment, said Gary Zrimec, North Ohio Heart’s chief executive officer.
In another whistle-blower suit unsealed in January, Kenny Loughner, the former manager of EMH’s cath lab, said he saw O’Shaughnessy and another North Ohio Heart doctor “routinely instruct EMH nurses and technicians involved in the procedures to record fictitious and non-existent complaints of chest pain” or falsify heart-monitoring records to justify needless operations.

‘Completely Unreliable’

An expert hired by the U.S. Attorney’s Office independently determined that “false statements” were recorded in some medical records to justify procedures, according to a memo from theU.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General.
Sozio, the hospital’s lawyer, called the expert’s finding “completely unreliable” and said it was “never raised in our discussions with the government.”
In 2005, the hospital opened a new cath lab that was marketed as “North Ohio Heart Center at EMH,” according to Loughner’s complaint. Tax records show 51 percent of the lab’s profit went to EMH and 49 percent to the cardiology group. The two merged in 2010.

‘Rarely Attended’

Loughner’s lawsuit accused the heart group of receiving kickbacks from EMH’s cath-lab budget and an extra $5,000 a month paid to O’Shaughnessy “under the pretense” that the payments were for his service as director of the cath lab.
“O’Shaughnessy rarely attended the committee meetings he was being paid to chair,” Loughner’s lawsuit says.
The kickback allegations aren’t true, said Sozio, the hospital’s lawyer. “There has never been any finding that any laws were broken, and in fact none were,” said Schaeffer, North Ohio Heart’s president.
The Justice Department joined the portion of Loughner’s lawsuit accusing the hospital and the doctors of unneeded stenting, and didn’t mention kickbacks or false records in the settlement agreement. Loughner received $660,859 of the $4.4 million settlement in the case. Wattar’s complaint was dismissed in January.

Doctors Needed

Satilla Regional Medical Center had a problem. In the fall of 2004, two cardiologists decided not to renew their exclusive contract with the hospital, according to the federal complaint. They were taking their patients elsewhere, and now the hospital needed to replace them, said Gregory Uhl, the former director of Satilla’s cath lab.
“They wanted to keep the cath lab busy,” he said in an interview.
It’s not easy to attract top doctors to Waycross, Georgia, about 240 miles southeast of Atlanta and perched at the edge of the 700-square-mile Okefenokee Swamp. Like many rural hospitals, Satilla has to pay “higher than average physician compensation due to pressures to recruit to the area,” according to a 2011 report prepared for Georgia’s attorney general.
Robert Trimm, the hospital’s chief executive officer, was already negotiating with a surgeon; he’d drafted a $350,000 salary proposal for Najam Azmat in May 2004, court records show, before the talks stalled. About a year later, Satilla went back to Azmat, with a guaranteed salary of $600,000 in his first year.

‘Full Spectrum’

A father of four married three times, Azmat arrived in the U.S. in 1983 after graduating from Khyber Medical College in Peshawar, Pakistan. He completed a surgical residency in New York and then joined the staff of Hardin Memorial Hospital in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, in 1996. By 2004, he’d left that post and was seeking a new one.
When he expressed interest in setting up his practice in Waycross, Azmat e-mailed that his goal was to build a “full spectrum” of vascular services -- including those involving work inside blood vessels, such as inserting peripheral stents, he said in a deposition filed last year in federal court.
When he applied, his only hands-on training in stents consisted of two weekend courses practicing on cadavers and pigs, Azmat said later. In June 2005, just before he joined Satilla’s staff, Azmat said he attended a two-day class in Louisiana where he implanted at least two stents in the renal arteries of live humans.

Credentials Questioned

Two months later, Satilla’s credentialing committee granted Azmat vascular surgery privileges. In its lawsuit, the Justice Department alleged that Azmat’s credentials didn’t cover stents.
While the three-page credentialing document doesn’t mention stents specifically, it says, “Privileges include, but are not limited to, insertion and management of arterial catheters.” In a legal filing, the hospital said Azmat’s privileges covered all the procedures he performed at Satilla.
Azmat was soon working steadily in the lab -- and almost from the start, nurses said they had doubts about him. When they scrubbed in with him, they noticed he didn’t know which catheters to use or how to thread them, former cath-lab nurses Evan Gourley and Lana Rogers said in depositions.
“He was very, very aggressive and rough,” Rogers said in her 2010 deposition. After her second case with Azmat, Rogers went to see Harmon Raulerson, then-manager of Satilla’s Heart Center. CEO Trimm was also present.

‘Teach Him’

“It’s completely obvious that he’s not been trained to do these procedures,” she told them, according to her deposition.
“Well, teach him,” Raulerson replied, according to Rogers’s testimony. Rogers and other nurses weren’t trained in stents either, she said. Raulerson referred questions to Clay Thomas, a hospital spokesman, who declined to comment.
During Azmat’s first stent operation, a cath-lab equipment salesman looked on, telling the doctor how to use the stents, sheaths, wires and balloons, Rogers testified.
In October 2005, Azmat found a blocked artery in the left leg of Allan G. Flower, a retired construction foreman. Then he inserted a stent in Flower’s healthy right leg, Tony Preston Smith, a Duke University professor of radiology, wrote in an affidavit.
The procedure was unnecessary and dangerous, wrote Smith, who was hired as a litigation expert by some of Azmat’s former patients. Azmat placed the device behind Flower’s knee, which is flexed so often that the metal stent could cause a blood clot requiring emergency surgery, Smith said. Flower died last year of lung cancer.

Four Tries

Norman Wayne Copeland went to the cath lab three times to get a leg stent without success. First, Azmat said the hospital had run out of stents and had to order another box, Copeland said in an interview. Days later, on Nov. 2, 2005, Azmat tore an artery supplying blood to Copeland’s left leg, medical records show. Azmat said he couldn’t insert the stent because of a “kink” in Copeland’s blood vessels. A third try failed too.
A fourth procedure successfully implanted the stent. Yet the type of operation Azmat performed was overly complex and medically unnecessary -- and the stent was too large for his artery, Smith’s report said.
The oversized device put strain on the vessel wall and could cause trauma leading to blockage, according to a medical review by Joseph Stavas, a radiologist at the University of North Carolinaat Chapel Hill who examined Azmat’s cases for the Justice Department.

Two Amputations

“It’s caused me a hell of a lot of pain,” Copeland said, rubbing his thigh as he sat in a rocking chair.
Lucille Peterson, a diabetic for 30 years, had gangrene in the toes of her right foot. In November 2005, Azmat told her stents would increase her blood flow, said her daughter, Elizabeth. During the procedure, he perforated an artery, the government’s expert report said.
Both legs were amputated afterward, Elizabeth said. There was “very little to no gain in circulation and the procedure is not medically indicated,” the government’s expert report said. Satilla billed Medicare $21,015.65 and collected $16,104.21 for Peterson’s care. She died last year at 91.
Nurses’ complaints to managers began to snowball. By Thanksgiving, four nurses had individually taken their concerns to various administrators, including Trimm, the CEO, according to witness statements.

‘Revenue Source’

Uhl, the cath lab director, testified he had a couple of “curbside” discussions with Azmat about his performance. He also spoke to Trimm and the hospital’s chief operations officer, Windell Smith, several times about Azmat, he said, and told Trimm he didn’t think the surgeon’s credentials allowed for stents.
“Nothing was done because of the money Dr. Azmat was generating for the cath lab,” Uhl said in an interview. “They saw him as a revenue source to do procedures.”
Smith and Trimm didn’t respond to messages requesting comment. In a deposition, Trimm said that he followed up on each of the nurses’ complaints and said he didn’t ignore any red flags. He talked to Azmat, checked in with subordinates to make sure they were dealing with concerns and questioned other physicians at Satilla about Azmat’s performance, he said. They told him they were unaware of any problems, Trimm said.
“I will always in these types of matters, when you’re questioning a physician’s training, defer to a physician to give me guidance on how to handle that situation or to evaluate that situation,” he said.

Possible Cuts

Just after Christmas 2005, Raulerson, the heart center’s manager, wrote a memo about possible job cuts -- two nurses, one tech and one registration clerk -- if the cath lab didn’t make enough money.
“I expect Dr. Azmat’s procedure volume to continue to increase,” said the memo, which is filed as an exhibit in the federal case against Satilla. “I will continue to monitor staffing and make recommendations.”
The next day, Azmat tried to implant a stent in an artery in Judi Gary’s pelvis. He tore her aorta, according to the government’s complaint -- and prompted what Uhl called “a total revolt” in the cath lab. Nurses threatened to boycott Azmat’s procedures, according to Uhl and nurses Rogers and Gourley.
Azmat voluntarily agreed to stop installing stents, Uhl said. Nurses decided to stay on the job.

‘Basically Steamrolled’

That resolution lasted only 10 days before nurses noticed that Azmat was scheduled to insert a stent in a patient’s renal artery on Jan. 12, 2006. When they went to Raulerson for an explanation, he said that “powers higher than within this department” had made the call, according to notes kept by nurse Marci Johnson. The typed notes were later entered as exhibits in state and federal lawsuits.
Uhl said he felt “completely ignored and basically steamrolled.”
Suspending Azmat’s privileges “was not in Satilla’s financial interest,” the Justice Department said in a 65-page civil fraud complaint that was filed in 2010 and settled last year. The hospital ran an ad in local newspapers touting his work in the cath lab: “Dr. Azmat keeps things running smoothly,” the ad said. “For example, your blood.”
Ruth Minter paid the highest price. A mother of five, she loved tending to her flower garden, according to court records. She’d been having back and stomach pain, and Azmat recommended a procedure to examine her kidneys and possibly insert a stent to improve blood flow to them, her medical records show.

Punctured Kidney

During her operation, Azmat ran a guide wire into the artery. He extended it so far that it penetrated the wall of her right kidney, a medical review found. Minter started bleeding -- though Azmat said in a deposition that he couldn’t tell that from the images he was seeing during the procedure.
Afterward, Azmat approached Minter’s family and told them he had placed the stent successfully, her family’s lawsuit says. They weren’t reassured. They saw nurses scurrying in and out of her room with bloody linens, they said in written responses to questions in the court file. Minter complained of severe stomach pain.
That night, she was airlifted 80 miles to Baptist Medical Center in Jacksonville, Florida, where she had emergency surgery to stop the internal bleeding caused by the kidney perforation, according to the federal complaint.
Minter died of hemorrhagic shock and multiple organ failure 17 days after her operation, the complaint said. Her stent procedure “was not medically indicated,” the Justice Department’s expert said later. Satilla collected a $10,872.56 Medicaid reimbursement for the procedure.

‘Worthless’ Care

Federal investigators found more than 30 patients who received “worthless,” poor or unnecessary care from Azmat, according to experts’ case reviews and other documents filed in federal court. Azmat denied providing substandard or unneeded care and accused the government of withholding medical records from expert witnesses.
Satilla was engaged in “Russian roulette being played with federal health care program patients,” Department of Justice trial attorney Arthur Di Dio said during a court hearing. The hospital’s administrators knew Azmat wasn’t qualified, yet allowed him to keep working, “profiting all along the way with the lucrative hospital service claims it received in connection with those procedures,” Di Dio said.
After Minter’s procedure, Azmat agreed to suspend his work in the cath lab, and Satilla agreed not to report any adverse actions regarding him to a national data bank or to Georgia regulators. A copy of the confidential agreement, dated Feb. 14, 2006, was filed last year in federal court.

Insurance Dropped

In August 2007, Azmat resigned from the hospital after getting notice that his malpractice insurance was being dropped, he said in a deposition.
Minter’s family and seven others sued Azmat, Trimm and other administrators, along with Satilla, alleging negligence and fraud among other counts. All were resolved without trial. Records from Georgia’s state medical board, which reports settlement amounts only above certain thresholds, show three medical malpractice payments by Azmat’s insurer in 2011 and 2012 totaling $2,025,000.
Nurse Lana Rogers filed a federal whistle-blower complaint, which the Justice Department later joined. In an April 2010, news release that responded to the Justice Department, Satilla called Rogers a “disgruntled ex-employee” and said it was being targeted by malpractice lawyers and federal officials hoping for “a payday.” When the hospital’s $840,000 settlement was announced in January 2012, Rogers received $189,501 of the total.

Medicare Exclusion

The HHS Office of Inspector General excluded Azmat from participating in Medicare and other federal health insurance programs in May 2012, records show. He failed to meet appropriate standards of care for six patients, the office told him in an earlier letter. The Justice Department dropped its civil case against him in July 2012.
Azmat, who still has a house in Waycross, referred questions to his lawyers. Attorneys Thomas Withers and Christopher Ray declined to comment. Attorney Adam Ferrell didn’t return e-mails or telephone calls seeking comment.
The Satilla hospital became part of the Mayo Clinic Health System last year. Trimm, who stayed on as chief administrative officer, left last month for a job with the Studer Group, a health care consulting firm.
After leaving Satilla, Azmat worked at pain clinics. In Lexington, Kentucky, he made $7,500 a week writing prescriptions for narcotic painkillers, though he had little formal training in pain management, according to the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure.
U.S. marshals arrested him in February on charges that he operated a pill mill with five other people in Garden City, Georgia. He pleaded not guilty and is awaiting trial. As a condition of his $100,000 bond, he agreed not to practice medicine.
To contact the reporter on this story: Sydney P. Freedberg in Miami atsfreedberg@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Gary Putka at gputka@bloomberg.net

Dentist In Massive Medicaid Fraud Case Sentenced To 8 Years


HARTFORD — A dentist barred from practicing elsewhere in New England was sentenced Wednesday to eight years in prison for operating assembly line-style clinics in Connecticut that targeted poor patients, performed unnecessary dental procedures and collected on more than $20 million in fraudulent claims from Medicaid.
Gary Anusavice, 60, operated networks of clinics in the south, central and western parts of the state from 2008 to 2012 and personally collected more than $3.3 million from the fraud.
Under a variety of settlements with the state and federal governments, Anusavice will pay more than $10 million in fines and restitution, in addition to giving the government his 8,000-square-foot home in Rhode Island, his boat, his Mercedes-Benz and about $90,000 in cash that investigators found in the home.

Anusavice opened clinics in areas where high concentrations of low-income people relied on the federal government's Medicaid program for medical treatment. Medicaid, which is administered in Connecticut by the state Department of Social Services, reimburses physicians for costs they incur while treating patients who are unable to pay.





The Anusavice clinics hired recruiters to leaflet poor neighborhoods, paying commissions to those who delivered patients. The clinics also offered shuttle services to and from appointments for patients, according to federal prosecutors and information presented in U.S. District Court.
Anusavice conceded the charges against him in Connecticut — health care fraud and tax evasion — when he agreed to plead guilty in federal court earlier this year. He failed to declare income from his Connecticut clinics and admitted paying others to hide money by shuffling it among accounts and phony companies.
"I apologize to the court and to anyone who was hurt by me and my activities," Anusavice said in court.
As his three sons sobbed in the gallery, U.S District Judge Vanessa L. Bryant called Anusavice "a persistent, diabolical, criminal."
"It's not a victimless crime," Bryant said. "You stole from each and every American."
Bryant said the theft allegations didn't begin to account for the discomfort suffered by patients who had "teeth unnecessarily drilled" or underwent other questionable dental procedures.
Bryant accused Anusavice of "slinking" into Connecticut after losing his dental licenses and being barred from participation in Medicaid in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
His first run-in with authorities was in Massachusetts in 1997, when he was convicted of making false health care claims in that state. Over the next eight years, he was convicted in federal court of filing false tax returns and punished administratively by licensing boards in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
By 2006, materials filed in court show, he had lost his dental licenses in both states and had been barred from participating in the Medicaid reimbursement program. His most severe punishment for a criminal offense was four months of home confinement on the tax charge.
Two years later, Connecticut announced that it was increasing the amount Medicaid pays to in-state dentists in an effort to increase the number of dentists participating in the program. The goal was to induce more dentists to treat low-income patients.
Within months, Anusavice had relocated to Connecticut and was setting up the first of his clinics, federal prosecutors said.
Anusavice hid his involvement, using phony names and trying to avoid signing documents, according to materials filed in court. But he was closely involved in the operation of the offices. Among other things, he hired dentists and support staff and trained them in submitting Medicaid claims.
Authorities described his clinics as "high production" offices. Prosecutors said he paid dentists based on the numbers of procedures they performed and "frequently criticized dentists for falling short on their production."
Assistant U.S. Attorney Susan Wines said Medicaid reimbursements to Anusavice clinics, made every two weeks, typically spiked as the clinics opened and began operating. In the case of the first group of clinics, she said, the payments began in the range of "tens of thousands of dollars" and soon rose to as much as $500,000.
Fraud investigators at the state Department of Social Services first detected illegal involvement by Anusavice in fraudulent practices, and the subsequent investigation came to involve state and federal prosecutors, as well as investigators with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which administers the federal Medicaid program.
The investigation eventually included a cooperating dentist who agreed to work undercover for the government. The undercover dentist recorded Anusavice during an employment interview, according to prosecution filings in court.

Wednesday, October 9, 2013

University of Miami Hospital overbilled Medicare $3.7 million, audit says

 
University of Miami Hospital.
CARL JUSTE / MIAMI HERALD FILE
University of Miami Hospital.





















The University of Miami Hospital will have to refund $3.7 million to Medicare after a federal audit of the hospital’s billing practices found the hospital overbilled in 2009 and 2010, according to a report released Tuesday by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General.UM issued a statement Tuesday saying the university is working “with the relevant federal agencies to determine the correct amount owed for billing inaccuracies.”
In July, UMH Chief Financial Officer Darryl Caulton filed a letter contesting the inspector general’s method for calculating the refund to Medicare, saying the hospital “disagrees” with the way the figure was determined.
The federal audit covered $22.8 million in Medicare payments to the hospital for 2,194 claims that HHS officials considered “at risk’’ for billing errors. From that pool of claims, investigators randomly selected for review a sample of 200 inpatient claims for services between April 2009 and December 2010 that totaled $2.9 million in payments.
Investigators found that although the hospital complied with Medicare billing requirements for the majority of the 200 claims reviewed, 68 claims — representing $524,009 in overpayments — did not comply with agency rules.
Based on those findings, investigators extrapolated the total amount of overpayments to be approximately $3.7 million.
“Overpayments occurred primarily because the hospital did not have adequate controls to prevent incorrect billing of Medicare claims within the selected risk areas that contained errors,’’ according to the inspector general’s report.
Investigators identified the questionable claims using computer matching, data mining and analysis of inpatient claims.
According to the report, the hospital overbilled Medicare in five ways:
First, hospital administrators incorrectly billed Medicare for patient stays that should have been billed either as outpatient or outpatient with observation services.
“These errors occurred because of weaknesses in the hospital’s review process and turnover in case management leadership,” according to the report. Investigators estimated the errors caused Medicare to overpay about $448,000.
In addition, investigators found that in three cases the hospital billed Medicare separately for a patient’s discharge and readmission on the same day — even though those charges are supposed to be combined into a single claim. The three cases, between April 2009 and December 2010, caused overpayment of about $33,645, the report found.
The third type of overbilling came through use of incorrect diagnostic codes, the report said, which occurred in five of the 200 cases reviewed, and led to overpayments of $17,475.
UM hospital administrators also erred by billing Medicare for three patient discharges that should have been coded as transfers because the patients were readmitted to other hospitals the same day they were released from UM Hospital. That led to another $16,407 in overpayments, according to the report.
Lastly, HHS investigators said UM overbilled Medicare by about $8,500 for one claim because the hospital didn’t get an available credit for a replaced medical device.
According to the report, the hospital may be able to re-bill Medicare for some of the claims that were found to be overpaid.
In a six-page letter addressed to HHS auditors, Caulton, the hospital’s CFO, said the institution accepts the findings and will tighten internal controls by using an electronic quality review process. Caulton also said the hospital will improve billing controls, conduct quarterly audits of short stay accounts and place an automatic hold on Medicare claims for patients staying less than three days until the claims are released by a case manager.
But Caulton took issue with the methodology used to calculate the refund amount, and requested that HHS reconsider the sum.
He said that some of the questionable claims may be eligible for re-billing and that federal officials should not have used a sample of cases to estimate the refund amount without first resolving the re-billing question.
In the letter, Caulton noted that other audits by the inspector general “almost without exception” recommended repayment solely of the audited cases — not estimates based on a sample of claims.
“There is no reasoned basis for treating UMH differently,’’ Caulton wrote.
Donald White, a spokesman for the HHS inspector general, said extrapolation is an “extremely common” practice in determining Medicare overpayments. But he added that the refund amount is a recommendation.
The next step, White said, is for UM administrators to negotiate a repayment amount with the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which administers the programs. The process usually takes 60 to 90 days, he said, but “given the government shutdown, it could be longer.”
The university bought the 560-bed former Cedars Medical Center in 2007 for $275 million. The purchase was one of several high-profile steps in the expansion of the Miller School of Medicine that included hiring more than 100 renowned researchers and creating a biotech research park to boost the school’s national profile.
The ambitious moves elevated UM’s medical school to the national stage, but they also may have seriously hampered it. In spring 2012, after suffering a $24 million loss for the first six months of that fiscal year, the medical school laid off more than 900 full- and part-time employees.
In August, UM and Jackson ratified their annual operating agreement for $102.5 million, the lowest-budgeted agreement in seven years. In the agreement, a binding letter of intent commits both institutions to multi-year exclusivity provisions for transplant, trauma, pediatrics and obstetrics services.

http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/10/08/3678166/university-of-miami-hospital-overbilled.html


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Harvard Pilgrim Brings Medicare Advantage to Central Mass.

Following a three-year hiatus, Harvard Pilgrim will once again offer Medicare Advantage in Worcester County.
The Wellesley-based health plan will reintroduce its Medicare plan to Worcester and three other Massachusetts counties at the start of 2014, the company announced Tuesday.
"It's best for the seniors," said Deb Rittenour, vice president for senior programs. "We're giving them options and we're giving them choice."
Senior citizens can begin signing up for Harvard's Medicare Advantage plan Oct. 15. The company is looking to expand its Medicare coverage to additional Bay State counties in 2015, Rittenour said.
Harvard Pilgrim discounted its fee-for-service Medicare offerings for Worcester County and elsewhere in 2010 after the federal government made the incentives for such plans less favorable, Rittenour said. Medicare Advantage is offered by commercial insurance companies, who in turn, are compensated by the federal government.


Embedding shared decision making in primary care

Sharing decision making with the patient benefits individuals and the NHS as a whole
Thames Valley health knowledge team
Making shared decision making a reality can be acheived if it is streamlined into routine NHS processes. Photograph: 3M

Overview

"No decision about me, without me" is the fundamental principle underpinning many of the current changes in NHS healthcare. Healthcare professionals may fail to recognise how knowledgeable patients are, or to understand the beliefs of individuals and groups. By engaging in balanced discourse, clinicians not only help a person come to terms with their needs and the potential gains and losses from different treatment approaches, but also broaden their own understanding of what is important to people.
The principle of engaged patients being well informed and taking a central role in all decisions made in their care is neither new nor revolutionary, but some patients may be passive receivers of care and many medical professionals, inadvertently or otherwise, are paternalistic in their delivery. Sharing decision making with the patient, referenced to understandable evidence and timely support when selecting investigation and treatment options, benefits not only individuals but the system as a whole.

Project Aims and Methods

Making shared decision making (SDM) a reality for patients can only be achieved if it is systematically streamlined into routine NHS processes, steering clear of lengthy bureaucracy. Nationally, a number of tools have been produced which now need to be rolled out locally and regionally. In order to support this work in the south of England, a 'community of interest' has been established to enable interested clinicians, who want to know more, to access training, ideas and peer support to try things out in their own clinical context.
Activities in the community of interest include a focus on integrating shared decision making so it becomes an integral part of the patient pathway and clinical behaviours. As well as embedding shared decision making from the provider perspective, SDM needs integrating into policies, commissioning systems and consent procedures. A particular focus therefore for the community of interest is to provide information, insight and advice about how clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) can deliver on their statutory duties, including practical tools and processes, and indicators of what "good commissioning of shared decision making would look like" at CCG level. A range of different activities have been delivered since the community was established, utilising new technologies to spread the word through different channels.

Findings

Twenty-two clinical commissioning groups across the south of England responded to an initial survey. Ninety-five per cent of respondents asked for more information or support on shared decision making. Fifty-six per cent of respondents definitely understood what SDM is trying to achieve and 63% indicated that SDM featured in their CCG plan. In relation to CCG plans, 45% included SDM in planned care (specifically MSK) and 35% in relation to long-term conditions. Fieldwork indicates that, in reality, CCGs are at very varied stages in their development which can be categorised as:
• Interested in SDM and currently developing an understanding of how to implement in practice
• Interested and with some engagement to introducing SDM in an identified clinical area
• Have a full SDM plan with internal accountability for delivery
The implications for the community of interest are to develop a wider suite of options to address the variability in practice. Regular WebEx updates from practitioners, tailored visits and expert mentorship to support specific initiatives, and the development of materials for patients and clinicians, are all part of the range of offerings needed to move individual CCGs on from their various starting points.

Recommendations

The wider implication for policy from the work carried out in the South of England is that more time and resource needs to be given to supporting the CCG community with practical help for implementation.
This includes developing an evidence base of the impact on patients of the use of patient decision aids and option grids, as well as assessing the impact on patient satisfaction of commissioning changes. Peer learning and clinical engagement are critical to embedding deep change in relation to shared decision making.

Working with Thames Valley HIEC

This project was carried out by the knowledge team, with project support from Pfizer Ltd and funding from NHS South of England and Pfizer Ltd. Pfizer are supporting the project as part of their commitment to work together for Britain's national health through partnership.
We can help you by:
• Involving you in the Community of Interest for shared decision making in the south of England
• Advising you on the appropriate level of support to help you meet your current CCG aims for SDM
• Signposting you to the national tools and approaches.
Thames Valley Health Knowledge Team
Contact: Email: knowledgeteam@tvhiec.org.uk

It’s Time for Episode-Based Health Care Spending


There is widespread agreement that if the United States is to achieve sustainable levels of health care spending, it must make greater use of payment mechanisms that reward physicians, hospitals, and health systems for the results achieved. The vexing question is how best to make this transition.
Today, payers and providers are using a range of strategies to accomplish this goal, including patient-centered medical homes, value-based contracting, and accountable care organizations (ACOs). We applaud this trend. However, our research and experience have convinced us that the transition to outcomes-based payment will occur more easily if both payers and providers take an intermediate step and make greater use of retrospective episode-based payment (REBP).
REBP focuses on “episodes of care” (any clinical situations that have relatively predictable start and end points such as procedures, hospitalizations, acute outpatient care, and some treatments for cancer and behavioral health conditions). REBP identifies which provider is in the best position to affect the clinical outcomes and total costs associated with an episode of care; it then assesses (through retrospective analysis of claims data) the outcomes achieved and costs incurred during each episode over a specific period of time (e.g., quarterly). The identified providers are then rewarded or penalized based on their average performance across all the episodes.
The desire to jump straight to outcomes-based payment models focused on the total cost of care for an entire population has led many payers and providers to overlook, or give up on, episode-based payment. We believe it is worth reconsidering.
The Advantages
REBP offers a number of advantages. For example, because it uses the current fee-for-services claims system as its administrative platform, it does not require providers to make significant investments in new infrastructure or establish new contractual arrangements with other providers. And because it focuses on acute episodes, REBP acts as a necessary complement to payment and care-delivery models designed to improve prevention and chronic-care management. Furthermore, administering and/or participating in an REBP model can help both payers and providers develop many of the capabilities they will need for total-cost-of-care management. In short, REBP can serve as a bridge to more comprehensive total-cost-of-care approaches.
How Does REPB Work?
In the U.S. health system today, a dozen or more providers may be involved in an episode of care, and each provider typically bills separately. None of these providers is rewarded financially for helping ensure that the desired clinical outcome is delivered with the highest quality at lowest cost across the entire episode.
REBP is designed to change that. It is somewhat similar to and shares many of the same goals as the “prospective bundled payment” approach, which calls for making a single payment (or budget) to the accountable provider for all the services used to treat each specific episode for each specific patient. But key differences in design and administration make REBP more scalable in the current U.S. health system.
How REPB and Prospective Bundled Payment Differ
The six core steps required to implement REBP are listed in the exhibit “Steps Required to Implement REPB.”
Steps Required to Implement REPB
Why Should Payers Pursue REBP?
Our analysis of data from private insurers, Medicaid, and Medicare suggests that 50% to 70% of all health care spending could be included within episodes of care. REBP establishes end-to-end accountability for more than half that spending.
REBP also gives payers a direct way to incentivize providers to reduce health care waste. We have consistently observed that some providers deliver the same or better clinical outcomes at dramatically lower costs than other providers in the same market. The exhibit “Average Cost Per Episode Varies Significantly Across Providers” illustrates variations in average, total per-patient costs for three different episodes in three different states. Even after we excluded patients with certain complicated conditions and adjusted for patient severity, the average cost per episode in each market still varied from 60% to over 300%. Further analysis showed that much of this variation could be explained by differences in practice patterns (e.g., decisions about device selection, diagnostics use, discharge planning, hospital admission).
Average Cost Per Episode Varies Significantly Across Providers
REBP also offers a quick path forward, because it requires only modest additional infrastructure. We have seen multiple payers define and implement the necessary infrastructure within six months of when they agreed on an episode’s definition. Turnkey analytic vendors are also beginning to emerge.
In addition, REBP gives payers considerable strategic flexibility. Many REBP parameters can be adapted to address local conditions, align with network and member-engagement approaches, and strengthen competitive advantage. Among these parameters are cost thresholds, stop-loss provisions, the degree of gain- and risk-sharing, whether and how to normalize unit prices, and whether to steer members to certain providers.
Finally, REBP gives payers a way to prepare for the future, when episode-based performance management is likely to be a required capability. Most providers do not have access to sufficient claims data to assess performance on their own. If providers are to accept partial or total cost-of-care accountability, payers will need to offer them a performance-management infrastructure to understand clinical outcomes and costs.
Why Should Providers Pursue REBP?
If contractual terms are fair, REBP can deliver meaningful value to acute-care providers in particular. For example, it has the potential to give them a net increase in margin, because many of the sources of savings are either variable costs to these providers (e.g., implantable devices, extra care required for surgical complications) or are associated with upstream or downstream providers (e.g., pharmaceuticals, physical therapy, skilled nursing facility care). REBP can also help acute-care providers reinforce and accelerate existing strategic priorities, such as improving how hospitals influence and partner with physicians, increase adoption of clinical pathways, and reduce input costs.
REBP empowers all accountable providers by reducing the need for payers to monitor clinical decision making (e.g., through preauthorization). It also positions them to assume a stronger role in influencing the performance of upstream and downstream providers.
Strong episode performance has the potential to strengthen a provider’s value proposition to patients, employers, and payers. It may also be grounds for negotiating a stronger network position.
Furthermore, REBP requires providers to make only small, if any, investments in new infrastructure — at least initially. And it will enable them to strengthen their ability to understand end-to-end performance, a capability any providers considering more holistic total-cost-of-care payment models will need.
What Changes Must Payers Make?
To implement REBP at scale, most payers will have to shift their focus from prospective to retrospective models in most markets. Doing so will enable payers to simplify their infrastructure and focus on analytic processes that are separate from claims adjudication. This infrastructure is less invasive, requires less investment, and offers faster time-to-market than do solutions that necessitate material changes to claims-adjudication processes.
Second, payers will need to develop greater technical sophistication to ensure fairness (e.g., through episode-specific risk adjustments) and provider acceptance. They will also have to develop or adopt new standards as they emerge. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation’s efforts to create standard episode definitions, including through the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative, are a promising starting point.)
Finally, if REBP is to succeed, payers will have to implement it at scale by promoting REBP, whenever possible, across all books of business and all network providers. Most payers should also strongly consider participating in multi-payer efforts to set standards to help overcome common barriers to implementation.
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